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The Spatial and Temporal Layers of Global History:  
A Reflection on Global Conceptual History through 
Expanding Reinhart Koselleck’s Zeitschichten  
into Global Spaces  
Hagen Schulz-Forberg ∗ 
Abstract: »Die räumlichen und zeitlichen Schichten der Globalgeschichte: 
Überlegungen zu einer globalen Begriffsgeschichte anhand der Ausweitung 
von Reinhart Kosellecks Zeitschichten in globale Räume«. Recent debates on 
global history have challenged the understanding of history beyond the nation-
state. Simultaneously, they search for non-Eurocentric approaches. This has re-
percussions on the relation between historical space and time in both historical 
interpretation and in research design. This article reflects on the possibilities of 
a global conceptual history by expanding Reinhart Koselleck’s theory of tem-
poral layers (Zeitschichten) into global spaces. To this end, it introduces the no-
tion of spatial layers (Raumschichten). First, historicisation and its relation to 
and interaction with spatialisation and temporalisation is pondered; then, the 
impact of global spatial and temporal complexities on comparative and con-
ceptual history is considered, before, thirdly, a framework of three tensions of 
global history – normative, temporal and spatial – is introduced as a way to 
concretely unfold historical research questions through global conceptual his-
tory. Regarding time and space, the main lines of argument in global history 
have focused either on the question of whether or not European powers were 
ahead of non-European ones or on the supposedly Western linearity of time as 
opposed to a non-Western cosmology or circularity of time. Taking its point of 
departure in Zeitschichten, which break from the linear-vs.-circular logic, this 
article instead proposes to foreground an actor-based, multi-lingual, global 
conceptual history to better understand spatio-temporal practices.  
Keywords: Agency, experience, concepts, transnational history, global history, 
modernity. 
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1.  Introduction: Time, Space, Experience and Global 
History 
Any theoretical and methodological innovation in global history is necessarily 
concerned with two main questions: how to find ways of writing history with-
out preconceiving it through the nation and how to design research that avoids 
Eurocentrism both while drawing its investigative questions and while drafting 
its conclusive interpretations. To this end, historical space and historical time 
need to be reconsidered from global perspectives in order to find ways of writ-
ing a history of equal terms, in which any actor from anywhere in the world is 
regarded as having equal validity. This transnational and multi-lingual history 
finds its sites in many spaces filled with varieties of temporalisations. Temporal 
uniqueness, temporal routine and presumably timeless normative horizons are 
neither bound by national space alone, nor expressed in merely mono-lingual 
ways.  
Since the nineteenth century, historians have had the habit of framing tem-
poral unfolding in national spaces. Inspired by postcolonial critique, the spatial 
turn as well as the transnationalisation of historiography and the historical area 
studies, global history fundamentally challenges this habit. I would like to con-
tribute to this new agenda and propose an expansion of Reinhart Koselleck’s no-
tion of Zeitschichten (temporal layers) to think about a) more complex histori-
cal temporalisations than national or Western and non-Western ones and b) to 
connect these with more complex historical spatialisations, with what I call 
Raumschichten (spatial layers) (Koselleck 2003, 19-26). 
Koselleck’s Zeitschichten form an integral part of his understanding of a 
plurality of history and his complex, alas unfinished, theory of history he called 
Historik (Hoffmann 2010, 213-23). Zeitschichten aim at undermining unques-
tioned ways of employing time in historical interpretation. Koselleck criticized 
that temporalities were usually expressed by either employing a linear (teleo-
logical or open-ended time) or a circular (repetitive time) metaphor. Instead, he 
proposed a more complex, three-track understanding of interlocked temporal 
layers: a) the layer of short-term unique experience, b) the layer of mid-term 
recurrent or repetitive experience without which one would not be able to iden-
tify the unique experience, and c) a long-term temporal layer which frames a 
period in time longer than generational experience and constitutes a normative 
horizon against which contemporary experience is measured (Koselleck 2003, 
20-5). This third layer, expressed by meta-historical categories, which translate 
into historical evidence (ibid., 301), can be understood as a normative order 
that frames agency, experience and interpretation.  
The historical change from one long-term, normative temporal layer to an-
other one has been called Sattelzeit by Koselleck (1972). The notion of Sat-
telzeit has been widely discussed in various ways and applied to diverse tempo-
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ralities and different layers of experience in European modernity (Leonhard 
2011). In the field of global history, the notion of Sattelzeit has been most 
prominently used by Jürgen Osterhammel (2009, 102-9), who addresses a 
plurality of overlapping, long-term changes in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century. As an illustration for the relation between temporal layers, 
Koselleck used, unfortunately, an example that merely connects the first two 
layers, the immediate and the mid-term. The mid-term layer is a layer of habit, 
of repetition, something happening in time and space to which societies and 
individuals are accustomed. The fact that the postman delivers mail every 
working day at a specific time of day is such a repetitive temporal experience 
for Koselleck. Usually, nothing important happens as we browse through our 
everyday envelops. However, this habitual pattern, this planned repetition of 
the same, is broken when surprising news reach us, such as the death of a rela-
tive (Koselleck 2003, 21). The third, normative temporal layer could have been 
included in the example if the postman had delivered different news; if, for 
example, a letter had been sent in which the addressee received the news that 
his forefathers had once owned the privilege to deliver the post. The ownership 
of royal or feudal privileges was connected to an understanding of freedom in 
pre-modern times. The privilege of being free is today a mainly personal privi-
lege connected to the rights of the individual as a citizen. Freedom used to be 
connected, beside other meanings, to having the privilege of producing or 
doing something: royal chocolate and marmalade, for instance, or delivering 
the post.  
Another illustration of the three temporal layers can be found in the Russo-
Japanese War from 1905, or rather in the reaction to its outcome. The fact that 
Russia, then conceived as firmly belonging to Europe and the West, lost to a 
non-European power was surely a unique surprise within the already estab-
lished global communication channels, and it drove home the message that the 
normative order established for so long, namely that European powers are 
simply ahead of all the others and thus undefeatable, was outdated.  
Importantly, Koselleck has also introduced two historical categories he 
called space of experience and horizon of expectation (Erfahrungsraum and 
Erwartungshorizont), making the point that the specific time and space of 
historical actors have a bearing on the way they imagine the past and the future 
(Koselleck 1985, 1989). Crucially, for Koselleck, Erfahrungsraum is a catego-
ry he connects to time. Experience is defined as present’s past. This specific 
past of a specific present is characterized by a selection of events that is incor-
porated in the present as its temporal-historical narrative (Koselleck 1989, 
354). Expectation is defined as present’s future and combines hopes and fears, 
wishes and will, worry, but also rational analysis (ibid., 355). Experience and 
expectation, for Koselleck, are useful categories since they combine past and 
future, and are thus well-suited as an approach to historical time (ibid., 353).   
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What is a space of experience? For Koselleck, events that are remembered 
and actions that appear as worthwhile to emulate constitute it. Yet, what does 
the interior architecture of an Erfahrungsraum look like? Does it not include 
layers of space from local to transnational, even global character? Do we need 
a conceptualization of global spaces to complement Koselleck’s Zeitschichten 
in order to better grasp the relations between historical actors and their space of 
manoeuvre, both physically and discursively? In fact, historical agents appear 
as rather passive in Koselleck’s theory, framed by their contemporary seman-
tics. I wish to acknowledge historical actors more and include a sense of crea-
tive and interest-based multi-level agency. Agency-based understandings of 
globality have been developed in anthropology, sociology as well as history. 
What I would like to add to the actor-based perspective is the role of concepts 
within the semantic spaces of manoeuvre available to historical actors. For this, 
a more sophisticated spatiality than Koselleck’s is needed.  
On the other hand, important theories and approaches to agency and its 
spaces, such as Bourdieu’s notion of the field (Bourdieu 1979; Kauppi 2000; 
Zimmermann and Favell 2011) and Kauppi’s analysis of the relation and mutu-
al influence of two distinct fields and transnational elite networks (Kauppi 
2005; Kauppi and Madsen 2013), lack a sophisticated understanding of time. 
They remain temporally flat (see Dorsch 2013 for an elaboration on further 
theories and their lack of reflection on time). I propose the notion of 
Raumschichten in correspondence to Koselleck’s Zeitschichten in order to 
address this shortcoming. History unfolds in a variety of spaces and actors do 
not only move, speak and make sense within one space, but also between and 
across spaces. The agency within different yet related spaces is mutually influ-
ential. Niilo Kauppi (2005) has shown how a European parliamentary space 
and national political spaces are related by rather recently developed ways of 
elite career networking within two connected spaces which follow quite differ-
ent logics of legitimacy. He took Bourdieu’s notions of field and habitus and 
transnationalised them. The different spatial logics, the European and the na-
tional, constitute arenas with different habits. Actors need to bring different 
social capital if they want to perform well within more than one space. These 
spaces of agency are simultaneously arenas in which actors follow certain rules 
of conduct and address audiences in specific ways. They also need to bring 
different narratives of time into the different spaces.   
Historical actors create historical space and its time as they move through it 
(de Certeau 1980), think through it and imagine the world through it. With this, 
they historicise it as they produce a spatio-temporal narrative. The application 
of Raumschichten to global history thus allows a move beyond methodological 
nationalism and Eurocentrism. Historical actors perform, with the help of con-
cepts, their interests and convictions within interconnected poly-spatial and 
poly-temporal settings.  
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The spatial turn (Middell and Naumann 2010) has importantly criticized a 
long-established tendency within historiography which took the spaces of tem-
poral narratives for granted. Mostly, these spaces were nation-states, clear-cut 
regions, and so-called civilisations. The interpreted, narrated time (Ricœur 
1983) unfolding within these unquestioned spaces was usually Eurocentric – or 
deliberately anti-Eurocentric.  
Yet, why should time be banned as something, presumably, undeniably tele-
ological? Indeed, pinpointing space against time, or vice versa, is not fruitful. 
Historians had a predilection to opt for time over space. This was critically 
noted by Koselleck (1986) already and has been criticised by the, mostly Ger-
man, proponents of the spatial turn (Schlögel 2003; Bachmann-Medick 2006; 
Joachimsthaler 2008). Koselleck favoured a temporal approach because he was 
fascinated by studying historical time, but he was glad that his preferred meta-
phor of Zeitschichten alluded to physical sedimentation in spaces and territo-
ries. I propose to think in spatio-temporal terms rather than in either spatial or 
temporal ones. In history and in historiography, time and space are connected 
by spatio-temporal narratives. Furthermore, it must also be kept in mind that 
history is neither time, nor space but constitutes a third category, distinct from, 
yet dependent on and related to both time and space (Koselleck 2003, 78f.).  
Below, I elaborate first the questions of spatialisation and temporalisation, 
and I illustrate their connection with Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of chronotopos 
(Bakhtin 2008). From the application of chronotopos to history, I derive the 
notion of uchronotopia in order to capture globally different ways of spatialis-
ing and temporalising social and political orders through interpreting the past 
and imagining the future in idealised ways. I then discuss the consequences 
Raumschichten have on comparative and conceptual history. In a final part, I 
introduce three fields of tension that mutually inform each other and through 
which the varieties of spatialisation and temporalisation in global history may 
be grasped: normative tension, temporal tension, and spatial tension. With this, 
I hope to show how interlocked both Raum- and Zeitschichten are in global 
history and how fruitful it is to foreground historical actors and their agency, 
and to link this agency to a multi-lingual, transnationally conceived global 
conceptual history.  
2.   Spatialisation and Temporalisation as Historicisation 
All forms of spatialisation and temporalisation produce their own historicity. 
Individuals, families, groups, societies and nations all have their modes of 
employing space and time, interpreting their experiences as they act in the 
present, grope in the past for narrative derivations and move towards an open 
future, which they hope to stabilise through their goals and dreams as well as 
the more rational calculations of their means. What is more, not only do differ-
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ent modes of spatialisation and temporalisation exist in regard to who is writing 
or narrating history, but also in regard to how. To capture the manifold ways of 
spatialising and temporalising historical narratives, Bakhtin’s (2008) notion of 
chronotopos is inspiring. In a unique way, he combines time and space in his 
analysis of the novel. His main claim about what makes a chronotopos is that 
genre has a decisive influence on how time and space interrelate in a narrative. 
Chronotopos, according to Bakhtin, is a ‘form-content category’ (2008, 8).  
Applying chronotopos to history, it describes ways of appropriating histori-
cal time, space and actors which are poured into many variations of explanato-
ry and interpretative narratives. Similarly to variations of representing time, 
space and actors in the novel, different genres of historicisation exist: historio-
graphy, memory, individual as well as collective, but also documentary film, 
diaries, a picture book, legal-political texts such as constitutions or preambles; 
all follow temporal and spatial, and thus historical logics of their own, bound to 
each specific genre characteristic.  
Additionally, from a global perspective, Chinese, Indian, or African genres 
of dealing with historicisation through spatialisation and temporalisation, or 
indeed any other form-content category narrating change over space and time, 
can be understood as varieties of historical chronotopoi. When the perspective 
is thus broadened further, global history appears as a field of seemingly infinite 
ways of producing narratives of spatio-temporal unfolding.  
Often enough, history is not only temporalised differently and poured into 
variations of spaces in which time and narrative unfold, but as it is temporal-
ised it becomes a utopian narrative. Reinhart Koselleck illustrated the shift to 
modernity with the shift from imagining the ideal society in contemporaneity, 
only located in a distant land or on some shrouded island, to imagining the 
ideal society in the same or at least similar space but in a different time. In fact, 
these imaginations should be called uchronia (Uchronie) rather than utopia, he 
pondered (Koselleck 2003, 35). His early notions of temporalisation have been 
further developed (Lepenies 1976) and thoroughly criticised (Seifert 1983; 
Stockhorst 2011, 370-8), mainly for assumptions in the field of natural scienc-
es.  
Here, it is not of primary importance whether or not Koselleck was right 
about his claim that the temporalisation of utopia began, as he argues, with 
Sebastian Mercier’s L’An 2440 from 1770/71 (Koselleck 2003, 133). Rather, 
the main part of Koselleck’s argument, which finds support from most critics 
as well (Stockhorst 2011, 386), is in the focus, namely, the fact that a diversity 
of temporalisations of human and social development, and the spaces in which 
they are supposed to unfold, are a key signature of modern discourses of legit-
imacy and history. Historicisation – an exercise which includes past, present 
and future – is made up of specific forms of spatialisation and temporalisation.  
When looking at normative horizons towards which history should develop, 
chronotopos becomes uchronotopia. The new normative orders towards which 
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societies should strive and against which agency is reflected are legitimised 
through chronotopoi and often poured into uchronotopias. Normative orders 
are not infinitely stable, however. The concepts which build the semantics of 
normative orders are disposed to contestation. Undermining an existing, incre-
mental or encrusted order, however, calls for a counter-narrative that builds on 
a reinterpretation of history and a projection of a better society into the future. 
These narratives of normative change exist in grand, sweeping, ideological 
mode as well as in less triumphant and less holistic forms.  
One characteristic of such narratives is the claim to universal, uncontested 
truth without which no legitimacy can be gained. Here, the ‘transcendental’ 
(Koselleck 2003, 25) character of the third long-term, normative layer of time 
comes into play as it interacts with the other layers of time on which historical 
actors make their claims and construct their narratives. Normative orders are 
embedded in rationalities and semantic traditions of specific moments in history.  
For example, in the early twentieth century the discursive positioning of 
China in the world underwent a process that has been called the internationali-
sation of China. The effect of this internationalisation was a perception and 
active translation and appropriation of key European or Western terms. In 
Chinese debates on social order and social change towards a different future, 
logics of temporalisation and the spaces in which it was supposed to unfold 
(urban centres, rural landscapes, and national unity) came into play. The terms 
xin (new) and jiu (old) were increasingly used, putting Chinese experience on a 
timeline. Wai (outer) and nei (inner) were also used and became synonymous 
for the same juxtaposition. Furthermore, within this new temporalised semantic 
field, the terms xifang (the West), jinhua (evolution) and, later, xiandai (mo-
dernity) were used identically when putting Chinese society into a global 
framework (Sachsenmaier 2014, forthcoming). 
The contestation of key concepts which constitute normative orders are, his-
torically as well as contemporarily, never isolated, national or mono-lingual 
phenomena, however, and often appear in a multi-lingual, transnational relation 
as in the above case of China as well as in other debates on and actual changes 
of normative order (Forst and Günther 2010, 15-26). Claims on time, which 
become claims on a normative order supposed to unfold in a specific space, can 
thus become a methodological route through which global history may be 
approached (Schulz-Forberg 2013).  
In Raum- and Zeitschichten, spaces are connected in what can also be ex-
pressed as a perspective of spatial scaling. This means that conceptual, themat-
ic and networked approaches from a global historical perspective combine their 
narratives of change over time with different spatial scales: from macro via 
meso to micro; from regions via nations to local structures; from global net-
works and institutions to regional ones and their national and local implementa-
tions and specificities – and back. From the perspective of global history, the 
plurality of history addressed by Koselleck becomes a plurality of historicisa-
HSR 38 (2013) 3  │  47 
tion expressed in different genres of narrating change, in variations of chro-
notopoi.  
For example, the case of Arab translations and appropriations of the concept 
of society described by Ilham Khuri-Makdisi (2014, forthcoming) shows this 
very well. When one of the main intellectuals concerned with debating Arab 
society in the late nineteenth century, Shibli Shumayyil, translated and dis-
cussed the concept of the social (al-ijtima‘i), he positioned it in a semantic field 
that mixed Arab traditions and transnational contemporary influences. The 
heritage of Ibn Khaldoun is integrated by Shumayyil into a narrative of social 
Darwinist thought and Marxist ideas unfolding in a wider, regional Arab space. 
These quite special semantics, in which the Darwinist ideas and biological 
metaphors of social Darwinism expressed by the German Ludwig Büchner 
were seemingly compatible with Marxism, Herbert Spencer and Ibn Khaldoun, 
constituted a chronotopos of regional, Arabic character that was related to a 
wider, transnational discourse of imagining society and the future (Khuri-
Makdisi 2014, forthcoming).  
3.   Global History’s Effect on Comparative and Conceptual 
History 
Global history is concerned with, among other things, connectivity. Mainly the 
interest in connectivity undermines nation-state logics. Harbour towns, trade routes, 
and shipping lines are among the spaces connected across nations (Hazareesingh 
2009), but also urban centres or peripheries as well as whole oceans, such as the 
‘black Atlantic’ (Gilroy 1993; Eckert 2007), which become new historical 
spaces. An interest in the networks of idea exchange and appropriation, in 
translation studies and in more global historical semantics is also noticeable 
(Neumann 2012; Burke and Richter 2012). These developments in global histo-
ry challenge the practice of comparative and conceptual history. Mainly, this 
challenge can be summarised with the phrase of ‘methodological nationalism’, 
a criticism which all social and human sciences seek to address (Amelina et al. 
2012). For historiography, the task is not an easy one. The discipline estab-
lished itself as a science in the nineteenth century under national auspices and 
is still mainly practiced as a mono-lingual, single-author exercise entrenched in 
nationally established scientific practices. Yet, the nation as the origin and base 
unit of historical comparison has been called to the bar. Approaches such as 
relational history (Osterhammel 2001; Walser Smith 2004) and entangled as 
well as transnational history (Werner and Zimmermann 2006; Pernau 2012) 
seek to address a more subtle and adequate way of writing history beyond the 
nation.  
Alongside methodological nationalism, Eurocentrism appears as a second 
major point of critical reference against which all global history is measured. 
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The need to ‘provincialise’ Europe and to put all regions and actors in history 
on a par by giving them an equally valid voice is strongly called for 
(Chakrabarty 2000). Indeed, Europe must be read as a concept synonymous 
with Western within critical narratives of subaltern, post-colonial and global 
history. In some cases, Eurocentric narratives are simply replaced by Sinocen-
tric ones (Frank 1998). A normative anti-Eurocentric perspective is just as 
biased and not a convincing alternative, however, simply because it merely 
confirms a Eurocentric worldview, albeit a mirrored one.   
The recent spatial turn in global history has in many ways effectively and 
importantly addressed the two main points of critique mentioned above, pro-
posed ways of operationalising global historical research by looking at, for 
example, ‘portals of globalization’ or ‘critical junctures of globalization’, and 
called for a new, fresh departure into global history (Middell and Naumann 
2010). The conflation of globalization and global history brings conceptual 
problems in its wake, however, as it dilutes the meaning of both, which I here 
understand as distinct from each other. One side-effect of this conflation is the 
perspective on space and time itself, as mainly those spaces are looked at which 
are expected to be filled with encounters and exchanges, connections and 
commotions, while other spaces remain ignored.  
A further impact of global history on the writing of general history can be 
detected when looking at the object of study, or, rather, at the way in which 
research questions are addressed. Here, an event-based approach is increasingly 
making way for a theme-based approach (Bayly 2004; Osterhammel 2009; 
Rosenberg 2012). Global history has an ever-increasing bearing on established 
ways of writing history and thus on ways in which time and space are related in 
historical narratives. It is influential well beyond its own core camp. The em-
brace of the transnational, and increasingly also the global, by traditional fields 
of historiography is testimony to this. Mainly, this influence has brought about 
a general widening of perspectives historians employ upon their original field 
of expertise as well as a trend towards inserting national or local histories into 
more complex transnational and translocal contexts. The adjective ‘global’ 
itself thus does not refer to the planet’s totality. It is a generic term representing 
recent, innovative approaches of doing history beyond the nation and beyond 
Eurocentrism in a way that does not abandon historical comparison, but dis-
tances itself from those elements of comparative practice that are based on 
methodological nationalism. The nation, accordingly, is not the starting point 
of historical analyses anymore, while it remains part of the result and becomes 
a transnational phenomenon (Conrad 2010). It is recognised for its role within 
global historical processes; nothing more, yet nothing less. Indeed, it can be 
said that the long period of nation-building, which began in the early nineteenth 
century, was a historical reaction to global trade and power relations. The na-
tion became, and remains until today, the main polity form. It is stable and 
simultaneously flexible enough to frame political struggles, contestations, and 
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negotiations among its citizens and to continuously readdress and at least try to 
solve the social question. This is not to say that the nation-state is capable of 
effectively solving all political, economic, and social questions. In fact, it never 
has been. To assume otherwise is an oversimplification of nation-state history. 
Indeed, the spatial tension between global economic spaces and national social 
spaces is one of the signatures of global history since the nineteenth century 
(Polanyi 2001; Bayly 2004). 
The recent developments in global history have also highlighted that meth-
odologically refined approaches need to be developed further, which allow 
searching for, showing and following reciprocities and entanglements, when 
and where they exist, and which establish a meaningful dialogue between the 
micro and the macro level. A multi-lingual, transnational history that finds 
inductive ways of treating its questions and findings is able to identify and 
analyse the complex spatialities and temporalities between the very small and 
the very large. The basic presupposition of an equality of all histories, be they 
European or not, which is ultimately the goal of connecting Raum- and 
Zeitschichten in global history, may be better served this way.  
Conceptual history offers a promising route to a source-based global history 
rooted and unfolding in these overlapping Raum- and Zeitschichten (Schulz-
Forberg 2014, forthcoming). Spatial layers are manifold. They follow two main 
characteristics, however: a unit logic creating presumably closed spaces lying 
on top of each other (the local, the regional, the national, the transnational, the 
global) and a network logic creating presumably open or more accessible and 
fuzzy spaces in more complex connectivities (Tomlinson 1999), expressed by 
terms like network, field (Bourdieu 1979), encounters, relations, or scapes (Ap-
padurai 1996) and cutting through the unit spaces. Especially Appadurai’s notion 
of five global scapes and an imaginary belonging to each scape is important for 
an understanding of spatial layers, which I would like to understand as more 
interactive than Appadurai’s five scapes that may transcend local or national 
units, yet appear as just as closed in their transnational shape when they exclu-
sively contain ethnicity, media, technology, finance, and ideas. In historical 
cases, these scapes are not easily confined as such, and there exist many more. 
In fact, they often overlap and inform each other as they are created by histori-
cal agency. Actors in Raumschichten address a variety of audiences in a variety 
of arenas. To this end, they must understand and follow the communicative 
rules in relation to each audience and to each arena. Historically, these audi-
ences and arenas were never isolated. 
The most well-known example for a single actor’s misconception of how to 
address a variety of global spaces may be Woodrow Wilson’s proposal of his 
conceptualisation of national self-determination at the end of the First World 
War. He meant the European nations emerging from the demise of the Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman Empire. And he meant that all other parts of the world 
would still need to go through a long learning process until they were ready for 
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autonomy. Global actors, such as Ho Chi Minh as well as Korean, Egyptian, 
Chinese and Indian intellectuals, understood him differently and demanded 
immediate self-determination for their nations (Manela 2007). 
When writing global conceptual history, the focus does not need to be on a 
comparison between understandings of certain concepts, but on relating con-
cepts, their translation, their appropriation, performance and application. The 
fact that certain concepts, such as society or citizen, do not share identical 
meanings because they are embedded in different semantic traditions and lan-
guages is not a convincing argument against comparing them in a variety of 
settings and languages. The objects of comparison do not need to be identical 
or have identical qualities. In fact, a certain semantic friction emerging from 
the different semantic traditions is highly interesting from a historical perspec-
tive. Recent studies on translations of concepts have begun to address this 
friction (Gluck and Tsing 2009; Burke and Richter 2012). 
Historical actors translate, appropriate, contest, in one word: use a concept. 
They do not do so in a vacuum, however. Their specific historical and semantic 
context, and the way in which they put the concept into practice, must also be 
taken into account. One concept thus plays different roles and differs in mean-
ing depending on its historical, spatio-temporal settings.    
One essential precondition for such a global conceptual history is the exclu-
sion of any form of temporalities of difference, or what can be called progres-
sive comparison with Koselleck (1979, 324), from the heuristic framework. To 
be sure, the imposition of progressive comparison plays an important role in 
history. Historical actors have continuously performed on the basis of such a 
line of thought, which refers to notions of models and their emulations, of 
being temporally ahead and behind, of being advanced and in need of catching 
up, of installing roads towards successful development, of who should be part 
of the race ahead and who should be excluded.  
The notion of progressive comparison inspired colonial agencies and civilis-
ing missions as well as the agency of the formerly colonized who, as for exam-
ple Jawaharlal Nehru or Gamal Abdel Nasser, mobilized the notion of being 
behind politically and socially. Progressive comparison should not, however, 
inform any contemporary historiographic approach. The important task for 
global history is thus to take normativity and the teleology produced by pro-
gressive comparison out of the theoretical approach and out of the hidden a 
priori sometimes found in the questions asked. To ask which essential charac-
teristics European societies possessed to become globally hegemonic empires 
in the nineteenth century is such a question. It is still built on temporalities of 
difference as part of the historian’s perspective and not as part of the history 
s/he tries to interpret. A recent example for the longevity of such a framing of 
historical investigation is Langewiesche (2013). Rather, the historicity of tempo-
ralities and their spatialisations need to be understood as a crucial element of 
what describes modern global history from the, roughly, mid-nineteenth centu-
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ry until our present day as well as the way in which experiences, imaginations 
(Schinkel 2005) and expectations are linked temporally through concepts and 
the normativities evoked through them.  
The theoretical claim of a global conceptual history is that temporal logics 
are also at work in non-Western discourses of legitimacy, inclusion and exclu-
sion. In many historical situations, this seems to have been the case. In fact, as, 
for example, Sachsenmaier (2014, forthcoming), Pannu (2014, forthcoming) 
and Khuri-Makdisi (2014, forthcoming) show, in Chinese, Malay, and Arab, a 
certain shift from cyclical to linear temporalisation can be found in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. However, a ‘linearization’ of Asian 
temporal semantics is certainly not the final and only research result. Rather, 
linear temporalisations are found among and mixed with older cyclical ones 
that keep having their role as a semantic reference system, for example, remi-
niscence to Confucianism in Chinese discourses. The question, globally, should 
thus not be whether or not the world is now imagining time in linear, presuma-
bly Western ways, but, rather, in which more complex, Koselleckian ways 
different temporal layers and spatial layers interact in specific historical situa-
tions and what role key concepts play in transnational, related historical set-
tings. It was not a single temporal logic that was globalised through the export 
of European concepts in the nineteenth and twentieth century, but variations of 
temporal logics and chronotopoi have moved into and developed independent-
ly, for example, in Asia through both self-reflection and conceptual appropria-
tion.  
4.   Normative, Temporal and Spatial Tensions in Global 
History 
One of the key signatures of modern history is the constant invocation of the 
future through a constant reinterpretation of the past. Predicting the future is 
among any society’s daily routines. The problem about prognosis is, of course, 
that it is more often inaccurate than accurate. Alas, to simply leave the future as 
an open, untouched tomorrow seems to be a frightening idea for both individu-
als and societies. This double-sided impossibility makes the modern dilemma. 
It is impossible to accurately foresee the future; and it is just as impossible to 
simply accept it as an open-ended temporal unfolding of human lives and so-
cieties. The requirement to forecast illustrates the complete temporalisation of 
modern legitimacies. Any legitimate agency is based on both temporalisation 
and spatialisation, and thus on historicisation. And it is guided by the conceptu-
al construction and recognition of a normative horizon that serves as the ulti-
mate legitimating factor; it may also be called Koselleck’s third, long-term 
Zeitschicht. For European history, this normative temporal layer was always 
just as double-sided as the art of prognosis and can be broadly grasped as uto-
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pian, or optimistic, and dystopian, or pessimistic temporalisations of human 
societies. The optimistic, Eurocentric, Enlightenment-based idea of human 
progress has inspired interpretations of humanity’s road to the good society – 
from Rousseau’s perfectibilité to Hegel’s notion of the world spirit to the claim 
on the universal validity of human rights and the good social order it repre-
sents. This modern global imaginary (Steger 2008) informed imperial agency 
(guised as a civilising mission), twentieth century international institutions and 
international law from the mid-nineteenth century onward until today (Kosken-
niemi 2001; Anghie 2005; Todorov 2005, 2009). It is at the heart of 
Chakrabarty’s anti-Hegelian argument to ‘provincialise’ Europe (Chakrabarty 
2000) as well as all scholarly inhibitions against the concept of modernity as an 
ultimately always teleological and Eurocentric discourse of global order. 
On the other hand, dystopian temporalisations of modern human history are 
not short of supply either. Amplified by the Second World War, the pessimistic 
visions of the post-1918 period were continued by conservative philosophers 
such as Heidegger who embraced a dystopian interpretation of history, but also 
critical thinkers such as Adorno and Horkheimer (1947) have written on nega-
tive dialectics of modernity and the ‘underside of modernity’ was uncovered 
later (Dussel and Mendieta 1996). These visions ponder the dark sides of En-
lightenment and the teleologies it produced against the backdrop of the experi-
ence of a devastating Second World War, totalitarian regimes and Nazi crimes 
against humanity and atrocities as well as the possibility of self-annihilation 
through the atomic bomb. Koselleck (1988 [1959]) himself provided a rather 
pessimistic interpretation of modern history and bourgeois society when he 
subtitled his work on Critique and Crisis with: Enlightenment and the patho-
genesis of modern society. In global history, modernity is still a very visible 
and highly contested concept. It is not necessarily an analytical concept, yet 
still functions as an explanatory and descriptive one. Bayly alluded to the riddle 
of the modern (2004), Osterhammel employed Sattelzeiten for global history 
(2009), and Carola Dietze and Chakrabarty engaged in a highly stimulating 
debate about the relations between modernity and global history, the former 
arguing for a modernity understood as an equal playing field for global histori-
cal actors, the latter repeating his case that modernity is all about hierarchy, of 
being ahead or behind, of keeping space in temporally asynchronous relations 
(Dietze 2008; Chakrabarty 2008).  
Independent of the theoretical understanding of the role of modernity in 
global history, the dynamics of temporalisation and spatialisation, yielding 
ever-new pasts and futures, lie at the heart of all discourses of legitimacy in 
modern history. These discourses are complex, much more complex than the 
simple circular-vs.-linear logic. Historical actors live, act and make sense in 
various, interconnected Raum- and Zeitschichten, each of which is filled with 
variations of chronotopoi. And, depending on the audience they want to reach 
and the arena in which they communicate, they apply different spatio-temporal 
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strategies and narratives. Rather than looking at whether or not a supposedly 
Western, linear temporalisation has spread globally, it may be possible to ap-
proach questions of spatio-temporal practice and historicisation through three 
interconnected tensions common to most of those practices and their chro-
notopoi: normative, temporal, and spatial tensions, which together constitute 
the main points of reference in discourses of legitimacy. All three categories 
are characterised by endogenous and exogenous tensions.  
Normative tension describes the continuous friction between the conceptual-
isation and contestation of the world as it should be and the experience of the 
world as it appears to be from the perspective of historical actors. The key 
characteristic of all normative tension is the conviction that human individuali-
ty and society can be actively ameliorated in a temporal movement toward a 
normative horizon. In this imagination of human self-control and the human 
ability to cut off the past and create a new tomorrow lies the conviction that it 
is actually possible to do just that. I can become a better I. We can become a 
better we. The projection of new normative horizons into the future, and the 
conceptual contestation about what this future should be like, gives agency a 
spatial and temporal dynamic. On the exogenous level, it may suffice to point 
to the recent contestation of universalisms such as human rights. For a Western 
normative temporal layer, human rights are indisputably part of the normative 
canon and are not to be questioned or undermined. From a Chinese perspective 
or an Indian one, the universal claim inherent in human rights brings forth 
critique (Sen 2001). To use another language and historical setting than the 
usually dominant Indian or Chinese examples, the endogenous contestation of 
normative tensions can be exemplified by the Malayan conceptual struggle 
about who should populate the newly demarcated space of the Malayan nation 
in the early twentieth century. One of the oldest concepts describing the Malay 
social order, kerajaan (kingship), was abandoned, and a new term gained se-
mantic hegemony, namely masyarakat (the people). For Malayan intellectuals 
and political actors in the 1930s, the concept of the social allowed for a new 
temporalisation and spatialisation of Malay history as Malay society was given 
a clear national border (Pannu 2014, forthcoming).   
Temporal tensions refer to contestation of historical interpretation. Which 
past for which space? Whose past is it? Who is writing the past? Who is the 
legitimate author of the past? For which future should we strive? These kinds 
of questions characterise temporal tensions. Contested temporalities are found 
on both the exogenous and endogenous level as well. A society continuously 
reinterprets its own past. This is not always a smooth, consensual process, but 
fraught with critique and contestation of how to come to terms with one’s past. 
Truth commissions and periods of transitional justice are just as representative 
for these kinds of endogenous contestations as debates about monuments sup-
posed to capture narratives of the past and how to remember it in order to pro-
vide for a better tomorrow. When it comes to exogenous temporal tensions, the 
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question about legitimate authorship of the past can be illustrated by the post-
colonial critique of Western historiography, which ultimately is about finding 
an endogenous voice that shuns away the exogenous authors from the formerly 
colonizing countries.  
Spatial tensions are often characterised by claims of spatial ownership, be it 
actual, physical, or discursive ownership as well as by the specific relations 
between spatial units, such as the global and the national. Claims on space are 
commonplace in history. Endogenous spatial tensions are thus, for example, 
different claims on the same space. Exogenous tensions exist just as well be-
cause different spatial layers mutually influence each other. The transnational 
business elites have a bearing on national and local economic performance. The 
global economy has a bearing on national social spaces. Transnational net-
works have a bearing on local and national elites. In all three cases, the seem-
ingly lower or smaller spatial unit has a bearing on the higher or larger level, 
too, as local actors talk back to the global, local markets influence global strat-
egies and national elites bring their traditions into transnational networks.  
There is no shortcoming of proposals for studying the global. Yet, most of 
the discussion is still on understanding the global rather than on operationalis-
ing research about it. Overcoming methodological nationalism and Eurocen-
trism has had repercussions on the conceptualisation of the global. To 
acknowledge that tout se tient, from the micro to the macro, and that all rela-
tions between all actors make up the global, is far from having a clear compass 
about how to do research, however. The study of concepts in transnational, 
multi-lingual settings based on an understanding of historicisation sketched out 
above may be such a concrete compass, allowing for single-author studies as 
well as for large team-based projects. Coupling such an innovative study of 
concepts with an actor-based approach takes conceptual history out of a seem-
ingly remote analysis of intellectual history and political thought, and re-
couples it with a contested global social and political history instead. The ma-
trix of normative, temporal and spatial tensions may be a fruitful tool for the 
employment of a source-based, case-based, inductive global history. I suggest 
basing such a historiography on an expansion of Koselleck’s Zeitschichten into 
more complex global Raumschichten. Koselleck’s effort at breaking up the 
cyclical-linear dichotomy is thus coupled with an effort at breaking up the 
national territorial imagination as the beginning and the end of historical reflec-
tion. Furthermore, such a historiography is able to engage with historical expe-
rience and with the various ways in which chronotopoi are articulated in global 
history as well as with the uchronotopias they produce.  
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